Harold Fuller v. Favorite Theaters of Salt Lake City : Brief for Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1951
Harold Fuller v. Favorite Theaters of Salt Lake City :
Brief for Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Gordon I. Hyde; Attorney for Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Fuller v. Favorite Theaters of Salt Lake City, No. 7640 (Utah Supreme Court, 1951).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1414
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
HAROLD FULLER, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
Case No. 7640 
FAVORITE THEATERS OF SALT 
LAKE CITY, a Corporation, 
Respondent 
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT 
GORDON I. HYDE, 
Attorney for Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
Statement of Facts ------------------------------------------------------------------ 3 
Statement of Points -------------------------------------------------·-·-----------· 4 
Point I-A clause forbidding the assignment of the con-
tract "without the written consent of the other," does 
not preclude an assignment of a right of action arising 
out of a breach of said contract.______________________________________ 4 
Summary ------------------------------------- ---~--------·· _____ --------------------------- 10 
INDEX OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
Name and Citation Page 
Butler v. San Francisco Gas & Electric Co., 168 Cal. 32, 
41 141 p. 818 ------------------------------------------------------------------ 10 
Dixon-Reo Co. v. Horton Motor Co., 49 N.D. 304, 191 
N. W. 780 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 10 
Marsh v. Perkins, 230 N.Y.S. 406 ---------------------------------------- 8 
Sackman v. Stephenson, 11 N.Y.S. 2d 69 -----------------··--------·--- 6 
Southwest Bell Telephone Co. v. Ocean Accident Corp., 
22 F. Supp. 686 ----------··-------------------------------------------------- 10 
Taylor v. Black Diamond Coal Co., 86 Cal. 589, 590, 25 
p. 51 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10 
Trubowitch v. Riverbank Canning Co., 182 P. 2d 182______ 9 
4 Am. Jur. 23 7, 239, 240 -------------------------------------------------------- 10 
6 Corpus Juris Secundum "Assignments" 3L ___________________ 7, 10 
Williston on Contracts, Rev. Ed. (Sec. 412) 1190 ____________ 7, 10 
Williston on Contracts, Rev. Ed. (Sec. 422) ------------------------ 10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
HAROLD FULLER, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
FAVORITE THEATERS OF SALT 
LAKE CITY, a Corporation, 
Respondent 
Case No. 7640 
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT 
STATE~IENT OF FACTS 
This is an action for damages for breach of a contract 
made between "Masterpiece Productions," a New York cor-
poration, and "Favorite Theaters of Salt Lake City," a cor-
poration of the state of Washington. 
Masterpiece Productions agreed to supply a schedule of 
films to Favorite Theaters to be delivered within a specified 
period and Favorite agreed to schedule and play said films. 
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Favorite thereafter notified Masterpiece that it refused to 
go on with the contract. Masterpiece, after attempting to 
obtain performance from Favorite without success, assigned 
all rights of action for damages arising out of said agreement 
to Harold Fuller, the plaintiff-appellant. 
• Fuller sued for breach of contract and Favorite defended 
that the contract was not assignable and therefore any assign-
ment of a right to money damages was void. The trial court 
ordered a pre-trial to decide whether the clause was a bar to 
such an assignment and held that it was. 
From the pre-trial order dismissing the complaint and 
from the judgment rendered thereon of "no cause of action" 
the plaintiff appeals. 
The only issue before the court on this appeal is whether 
a clause prohibiting the assignment of the contract also pre-
vents the assignment, after breach, of rights of action arising 
out of the breach. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
A CLAUSE FORBIDDING THE ASSIGN!viENT OF 
THE CONTRACT BY ONE PARTY "WITHOUT THE 
~7RITTEN CONSENT OF THE OTHER," DOES NOT 
PRECLUDE AN ASSIGNMENT OF A RIGHT OF ACTION 
ARISING OUT OF A BREACH OF SAID CONTRACT. 
The defendant, at the pre-trial, moved that the plaintiffs 
complaint be dismissed on the ground that, since the contract 
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was not assignable, any attempt to assign a right of action 
arising out of a breach of this contract was not effective and 
the plaintiff-assignee could consequently have no standing in 
court. 
It is submitted that the court below failed to see the very 
important distinction between an assignment of the contract 
and an assignment of a right to damages arising out of the 
defendant's breach of the contract. 
Every case cited by counsel for the defendant in his brief 
to the Court below stood only for the following propositions: 
a. A contract may be so personal in its nature that it 
cannot be assigned. 
b. The parties may provide against assignment of a 
contract. 
None of these cases were in point. In the case before this court 
the contract had been breached and performance was no longer 
possible. All that remained was a duty upon_ the defendant 
to pay the liquidated damages agreed to in the contract. Such 
a right to damages is universally held to be assignable even 
though the contract was not. 
The clause upon which the respondent relies reads as 
follows: 
"ASSIGN1v1ENT UPON SALE OF THEATER-
SIXTH: This license shall not be assigned by either 
party without the written consent of the other, and 
the sale or transfer by the Exhibitor of all or any part 
of his interest in the theatre specified herein shall not 
relieve him of his obligations hereunder without the 
'I) 
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written consent of the Distributor at its home office 
in New York City first had and obtained." 
The court below in granting the defendant's motion to 
dismiss, in effect held that as a matter of law such a clause 
prevented any assignment of rights of action resulting from 
a breach of the contract. It is respectfully submitted that the 
language of the clause clearly shows that the only intent of 
the parties was to prohibit the assignment of performance of 
their respective duties under the contract. Such clauses are 
standard dauses in contracts where the parties desire to 
bargain for the performance of each other, but once the con-
tract is breached and performance can no longer. be had, it 
does not bar an assignment of any rights of action accruing 
as a result of the breach. In this case the parties desired the 
performance of each other but when the defendant-respondent 
refused to take the films as agreed, performance by the as-
signor of the plaintiff -appellant was no longer possible, and 
the plaintiffs assignor had a right to the payment of money 
damages which right could be assigned. 
In the case of Sackman t'. Stephenson, 11 N. Y. S. 2d 69, 
the court was presented with an identical problem and it cor-
rectly distinguished between an assignment of the contract and 
an assignment of a right of action arising out of a breach of 
the contract. In that case a correspondence school agreed to 
teach, counsel, and supply materials for study to the defendant 
in consideration for the defendant's promise to pay for the 
service in monthly instalfments. The defendant failed to 
pay as promised. The school then assigned the contract for 
collection to Sackman. The defendant set up as a defense 
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(just as Favorite Theaters has done in our case) that the con-
tract was not assignable and thus the plaintiff-assignee had 
no standing to sue for the breach of the contract. The trial 
court so held. 
The Supreme court in reversing the trial court correctly 
observed: 
"The contract at bar is a contract of a personal 
nature involving the relation of personal confidence, 
individual instruction under the supervision of a teach-
ing staff and practical experience in the Institutes train-
ing laboratory. 
The rule, however, applies to an executed cont-ract. 
Here the defendant breached the contract. The monthly 
installments all fell due before the action was started. 
The plaintiff's assignor, however, did not assign an 
executed contract, but a right to recover damages based 
on a contract which the defendant breached. A chose 
in action may be assigned which was all that wetS done 
in this case. There is no defense to the action." 
The rule is clearly stated by Professor Williston tn his 
famous treatise on contracts: 
"A contract which was too personal for assignment 
may, on its breach, give rise to an assignable action for 
damages." Williston on Contracts Rev. Ed., Sec. 412 at 
p. 1190. 
Again this fundamental distinction is observed by the 
editors of Curptts Juris Secundum "Assignments No. 31": 
"A right of action for damages for a breach ?f co~­
tract may be assigned, even though the contrctct ttself iJ' 
not assignable." 
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In Marsh v. Perkins, 230 N. Y~ S. 406, the court was con-
cerned with this very problem and correctly restated the rule. 
The plaintiffs conceded in that case that the contract itself was 
not assignable but contended (as the plaintiff-appellant did in 
the case before this court) that the cause of action arising out 
of the broken contract was assignable. The court in holding 
the assignment valid said: 
"The sole point raised by the defendant on its mo-
tion to dismiss the complaint is that the rights of 
the defenndant under the contract of September 21, 
1925, are not assignable and that the plaintiffs, as 
his assignees, are therefore without standing to main-
tain this action.'' 
"It is their contention that they are relying not upon 
an assignment of the agreement proper, but rather 
upon the transfer to them, AFTER BREACH, of such 
causes of action as Tench may have possessed ... 
by reason of their failure to comply with the contract." 
After stating this issue, which is the exact issue that is 
before the court in the instant case, the court quotes "Williston" 
as cited in this brief supra and held: 
"In Williston on Contracts, the author points out 
that AFTER BREACH« cause of action based thereon 
may be assigned, although the contract itself was 
theretofot'e non-assignable. The motion is accordingly 
denied." 
This court correctly distinguished between the contract and 
a cause of action arising as a result of a breach of a contract. 
There is good reason to limit the performance of a personal 
contract to performance by th_e parties to it. There is no reason 
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to limit one in whose favor a cause of action has arisen from 
assigning his right to money damages after a breach of the 
contract. 
In Trubou·itch z·. Rizoerbank Canning Co., 182 P. 2nd 182, 
the court went further and allowed an assignee of a contract 
which was made specifically not assignable to enforce a term 
of the contract. In that case A and D had a contract involving 
the sale of a shipment of tomato paste. The contract contained 
a provision that in the event of breach, the parties would sub-
mit the controversy to an arbitration board to determine the 
equities and assess the damages and costs. The contract con-
tained the following clause: 
"This contract is not assignable and goods sold here-
under are not to be shipped or diverted to any destina-
tion other than that herein specified, without consent 
of the seller." 
P, assignee of the contract, sued to enforce the arbitration 
clause and have damages assessed for the breach. D plead 
in answer to the plaintiffs complaint "that defendant never 
at any time consented to any assignment of said contract'' 
p. 185. (The same defense was set up by Favorite Theaters 
in this case). The case was submitted to the court on briefs 
just as it was in the case now on appeal before this honorable 
court. The trial court held, just as the trial court did in the 
case before this court, that plaintiff had no standing to compel 
defendant to arbitrate the controversy and dismissed plaintiff's 
complaint. 
The plaintiff on appeal from this judgment contended that 
the assignment of a right to have money damages assessed was 
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assignable even though the contract clause prohibited the 
assignment of the contract. The court said: 
"It is established that a provision in a contract or · 
a rule of law against assignment does not preclude the 
assignment of money due or to become due under the 
contract (Butler v. San Francisco Gas & Electric Co., 
168 Cal. 32, 41, 141 P. 818; Taylor v. Black Diamond 
Coal Min. Co., 86 Cal. 589, 590, 25 P. 51; Dixon-Reo 
Co. v. Horton Motor Co., 49 N.D. 304, 191 N.W. 
780; see 76 S.L.R. 1307; 2 Williston on Contracts Rev. 
Ed. # 422) or of money damages for the breach of the 
contract." (Citing long line of cases so holding to-
gether with 2 Williston, Contracts Rev. Ed. Sec. 412, 
p. 1180; 4 Am. Jur. 237, 239, 240; 6 C.J.S. Assign-
ments #31, p. 1080.) p. 185." 
It might be of interest to the court to note, that even in 
the cases where the contract specifically provides that any claims 
arising under the contract cannot be assigned, the courts hold 
that such a clause does not prevent an assignment of a right 
of action: 
"A provision in a policy against assignment does not 
apply to assignment after loss, and a specific prot1ision 
against such an assignment is null and void, as incon-
sistent with the covenant of indemnity and CON-
TRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY." Southwest Bell Tele-
phone Co. t!. Ocean Accident Corp., 22 F. Supp. 686. 
SUMl\1ARY 
The trial court erred in holding that paragraph six in 
the contract prevents a valid assignment, after breach, of a right 
10 
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to liquidated damages arising as a result of the respondent's 
failure to perform the contract. 
The clause does not, by any possible construction prevent 
an assignment of this chose in action. The intention of the 
parties was clearly to prevent the assignment of performance 
to a stranger and not to prevent the assignment of a right to 
money damages. 
Respectfully submitted, 
11 
GORDON I. HYDE, 
Attorney for Appellant 
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